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Yemen 
SHEILA CARAPICO 
IN FEBRUARY 2011, Tawakkol Karman stood on a stage outside Sanaa 
University. A microphone in one hand and the other clenched defiantly 
above her head, reading from a list of demands, she led tens of thou-
sands of cheering, flag-waving demonstrators in calls for peaceful politi-
cal change. She was to become not so much the leader as the figurehead 
ofYemen's uprising. On other days and in other cities, other citizens led 
the chants: men and women and sometimes, for effect, little children. 
These mass public performances enacted a veritable civic revolution 
in a poverty-stricken country where previous activist surges never 
produced democratic transitions but nonetheless did shape national 
history. Drawing on the Tunisiari and Egyptian inspirations as well as 
homegrown protest legacies, in 2011 Yemenis occupied the national 
commons as never before. Whether or not their aspirations would be 
met, the country's youth-who are the demographic majority-had 
animated a public civic renaissance. Women's very public participation 
was one powerful signifier of seismic sociocultural change. 
Youthful pro-democracy activists, gray-haired socialists, YouTube 
videos, gun-toting cowboys, Northern carpetbaggers, mutinous army 
officers, Shia insurgents, kids wearing face paint, tear gas canisters, 
WikiLeaks cables, performance arts, foreign-born jihadists, dissident 
tribal sheikhs, and a female Nobel Peace Prize laureate: Yemen's upris-
IOI 
ing combined slogans and motifs from the Egyptian and Tunisian revolts 
with elements of repression emulating Libya and Syria and quintessen-
tially colloquial practices in a gaudy, fast-paced, multilayered revolu-
tionary theater verging on the macabre. The most important trajectory 
was that day after day, with special energy on Sabbath Fridays, in cities 
and towns across the land, men, women, and children agitated against 
dictatorship and the politics of violence. Whether this popular inti-
fada-wracked by intra-elite street battles and complicated by Ameri-
can operations against the local branch of al-Qaeda-would end in glory 
or tragedy, its social, psychological, and political significance was ines-
timable. Regardless of the near-term outcome, as in Tunisia and Egypt, 
the experience of collective contentious mobilization "from below" in 
solidarity with fellow Yemenis and other Arabs had been transforma-
tive for young women and men. They had tasted the power of social 
mobilization. 
The 2011 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to two Liberian 
women who helped pull their country out of the abyss of cruel and 
brutal civil war and to a Yemeni spokesperson for her country's human 
rights constituency. Nominated inJanuary 2011 shortly after her release 
from temporary detention and honored by the committee in Oslo for 
representing the popular outcry for liberty and justice across the whole 
Arab region, Tawakkol Karman dedicated her prize to all Arab demon-
strators and martyrs during the year's revolutionary upheavals. "I am so 
happy," she told the New York Times, "and I give this award to all of the 
youth and all of the women across the Arab world, in Egypt, in Tunisia" 
(quoted in Cowell, Kasinof, and Nossiter 2orr). 
When the prize was announced October 7, Yemen's "peaceful 
youth" (shabab al-silmiyya) had been in the streets daily for eight 
months demanding an end to a three-decades-old dictatorship. With 
their turnout multiplied by their endurance, Yemenis had clocked more 
demonstrator-days in 2011 than more populous countries such as Egypt. 
They had practiced novel public modes of expression, combining indig-
enous arts such as oral poetry recitation, local dances, and public prayer 
with novel technological applications that allowed them to blog and 
post and tweet. They rejoiced and uploaded celebratory messages to the 
Internet upon hearing the news from Oslo. Defying the return volley 
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of rockets and tear gas, protesters called for an international tribunal to 
bring President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his cronies to justice. 
The uprising that began in January in "Change Square," Midan al-
Taghayr, near Sanaa University was part of the broader Arab revolution 
yet also organically associated with Yemeni culture and political history. 
Yemenis adopted North African slogans, "Irhal" and "Isqat al-nizam," 
calling for the departure of the president and the rest of his regime 
(Rosen 2001). As in Egypt, there was advance planning for a first day of 
protests, but the outpouring and momentum from below soon surpassed 
the wildest dreams of would-be organizers. Bypassing the organized 
formal elite partisan opposition of the Joint Meeting Parties, youth 
congregated in ever-increasing numbers to air their frustrations. In 
contrast with metropolitan Cairo's central Liberation Square-Midan 
al-Tahrir-where fantastically photogenic multitudes were filmed 
from nearby balconies of high-rise hotels by international television 
crews, Yemen's marches, like its twenty-some million inhabitants, were 
relatively more dispersed among a half dozen major cities and several 
smaller towns. Millions strong, they drew much less worldwide media 
attention than any of the other major upheavals of the 'fuab Spring": 
those in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. 
Yet via phone, Arabic-language satellite television, and the World 
Wide Web they were very much in touch with what was going on 
elsewhere in the region. Interestingly, unlike in Egypt where to some 
it seemed that Facebook and the Internet sparked the revolution, in 
Yemen Facebook membership, blogs, and YouTube posts proliferated 
from mere handfuls of elites with friends abroad in late 2010 to major 
means of communications a year later. It was a cyberexplosion. Thou-
sands ofYemenis joined Facebook during the spring of 2011, others cre-
ated Facebook pages, still more blogged in Arabic or English or other 
languages, hundreds practiced guerrilla photojournalism. Virtual par-
ticipants among Yemeni emigrant communities overseas passed images 
on, and some were picked up by Al Jazeera or analyzed from abroad. 
As in Egypt, however, for all the talk of a digital revolution, mobile 
phones were by far the most salient form of technology for domestic 
communication, and word of mouth spread news within and between 
neighborhoods. 
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Discontent in the poorest Arab country had been simmering for 
years on a number of fronts and levels. Patronage was rampant (Alley 
2010), and restlessness stirred around the president's clear intention to 
ordain his son, already commander of the nation's Republican Guard, 
as his successor. Added to this were the postponement of parliamentary 
elections; widespread unemployment, especially among the youth; dete-
riorating standards of living for all but the upper echelons of the ruling 
kleptocracy; ecological depredations to a formerly self-sufficient farm 
economy; a consequentially decimated ecology and acute water short-
ages; abysmal educational and medical facilities, sanitation, and physical 
infrastructure; crude resort to censorship, harassment, arbitrary deten-
tion, and brutality against journalists, dissidents, and regime opponents; 
and profound, widespread malaise. 
By late 2010 regional demonstrations or uprisings had cropped up 
in different parts of the country with seemingly different complaints. 
Most dramatically, governorates in what had been the South Yemeni 
territory known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen until 
1990 formed a movement (known simply as al-Hirak) for secession. 
Agitators had been marching and staging displays in the Indian Ocean 
port city of Aden and outlying provinces such as Hadramawt and Abyan 
for several years. 
Although Southerners rightly felt particular discrimination, things 
were not well either in the former North Yemen, where Saleh had ruled 
since the assassination of his predecessor in 1978. There was a more 
openly armed rebellion rooted in complicated, sometimes counterintui-
tive sectarian and tribal frictions around villages and valleys in the far 
northern province of Sa'adah, seemingly exacerbated by proximity to 
the Saudi border (Weir 1997). 
In cities and provinces between these geographical extremes, people 
were disheartened by high-level corruption, graft, nepotism, and favorit-
ism toward the president's Hashid tribal confederation, including high-
ranking military officers. Often, resentments were highly localized: as 
we will see below, rival tribes and inhabitants of the Red Sea coast and 
merchants and farmers from the "middle regions" all expressed particu-
lar regional and communal concerns. 
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Yet, remarkably, over the course of 2on, protests coalesced around 
a national, pro-democracy, reformist consciousness. To grasp this aston-
ishing episode of mass civic engagement, it is useful to review earlier 
waves of activism and the ways they constituted national and local public 
civic realms. From the mid-twentieth century onward, each generation 
enjoyed a moment of civic efflorescence: the independence movement 
in the Crown Colony of Aden and the South Arabian Protectorates in 
the 1950s and 1960s, self-help community betterment projects primar-
ily in North Yemen in the 1970s and 1980s, and a vibrant if short-lived 
democratic opening after unification of the two parts of the country in 
the 1990s. The civic outburst of 2on, the fourth such opening, drew on 
earlier experiences but also shared many elements with what became 
known in English as the Arab Spring. 
Activist Surges and Public Spheres 
Civil society is usually thought of as a zone of voluntarism, philanthropy, 
and public-spirited discourse beyond the affective bonds of family, 
distinguishable from entrepreneurial ventures and outside the formal 
apparatus of the state. Most theories of peaceful democratic transitions 
hold that a vibrant civic associational network and a lively public intel-
lectual sphere of civility are the sine qua non for the development of 
liberal democracy. It is sometimes argued that formal, modern, liberal, 
intellectually informed associations often dubbed NGOs (for "nongov-
ernmental organizations'') are the ne.cessary precondition for meaning-
ful political reform, or, on the other hand, that civil society cannot exist 
except under constitutional, elected governments. By these criteria 
many scholars and pundits, Arab as well as Western, often doubted 
whether it was possible to speak of civil society anywhere in the region, 
much less in quaint and colorful but underdeveloped Yemen. Certainly 
the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, like other Arab dictatorships, 
had worked nonstop to curtail, co-opt, and contain civil society within 
government-dominated institutions or ruling-party bureaucracies. 
Yet looking at Egypt, Yemen, and other countries' subaltern social 
movements even before these uprisings, we had recognized that when 
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circumstances demand, civil society can enable communities to cope 
with physical or political adversity, to navigate bureaucratic obstacles, 
and even to challenge authoritarianism. Moreover, although successful 
mass movements had been rare, we knew that in the Arab region as a 
whole and in Yemen in particular, when legal avenues for complaint and 
lobbying are exhausted and conditions become intolerable, there are 
exceptional, take-to-the-streets civic moments of mass engagement, 
whether organized or spontaneous (Carapico 2010). 
Civic activism is a variable, then, not a cultural constant. It con-
sists not only of formal organizations but also of various ways people 
exercise collective agency. Shaped by sociocultural, economic, and 
political-legal circumstances as well as trends in the Arab and interna-
tional arenas, civil society in Yemen has expanded and contracted and 
varied in shape and content in radically context-dependent ways during 
the past half century or so. Prior to the 2011 upheaval, the older genera-
tion recalled three distinct and distinctive expansions of civic activity 
in different times, places, and circumstances. Note in advance that 
none of them had a democratic outcome. Actually, they all ended with 
a kind of dialectical boomerang effect: closure of public civic space by 
"states" that drew legitimacy from the same popular energies they sub-
sequently sought to repress. While progress toward democracy or even 
modernity was halting and faltering, each time people took matters 
into their own hands, they left an indelible legacy on national politics, 
governance, and society. 
The first great Yemeni civic opening occurred in what were then 
Aden Colony and the Protectorates of South Arabia during the late colo-
nial era in the 1950s and 1960s. The South Yemeni independence move-
ment, in its civilian manifestations as well as in the armed resistance, 
was part of a larger Third World struggle for national self-determination 
and an Arabian flowering of political, artistic, and civic expression, 
much of it class based (Halliday 1974). Unionized labor stoppages, mass 
street marches, the distribution of political pamphlets and newspapers, 
hunger strikes, the founding ofYemen's first feminist organizations, and 
other arguably imported actions, especially among the polyglot workers 
inAden port, combined with creative political performances drawing on 
religious or tribal traditions in small towns in the Hadramawt and Lahj. 
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This remarkable populist outburst, culminating under complicated 
circumstances in the departure of British administrators from Aden 
and points east in late 1967, did not survive the independence era. A 
briefThermidor was followed by a reign of terror. As in so many other 
countries, from Cuba to Algeria to Vietnam, hard-fought postcolonial 
independence enabled a revolutionary ruling party, the Yemeni Social-
ist Party (YSP), to nationalize and centralize all forms of participation 
into national federations for labor, women, journalists, intellectuals, and 
other corporate groups. Under the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY), women enjoyed rights unparalleled in the Arabian Pen-
insula if not the whole Arab world: polygamy was outlawed, for instance. 
Other progressive social policies were pursued. Yet postrevolutionary 
fervor amalgamated mass mobilization to the party-state project. Civil 
society retreated underground or fled into North Yemen. The last ves-
tiges of the populist movement that brought it to power were eviscer-
ated in a bloody two-week shoot-out among the Socialist Party elite in 
1986. 
The second civic renaissance occurred mostly in North Yemen after 
the downfall of the thousand-year-old Zaydi imamate in 1962 and the 
establishment of a weak republican government, when communities 
undertook their own modernization with only minimal assistance from 
the ostensibly central state. Unlike the South, the Republic of Yemen 
had no colonial history to speak of and was extraordinarily backward 
(Halliday 1974). There were hardly any paved roads, public schools, or 
municipal power and water supplies. Combining a forward-looking urge 
with native urban management and communal practices including tribal 
customs, cities and regions built thousands of kilometers of roads and 
hundreds of primary and middle schools, and rigged up scores of water 
delivery and electrical power stations. Most of these activities were ad 
hoc; committees organized around a project often dissolved after its 
completion. On the other hand, in some localities, especially the Ta'izz 
region, elections were held for local development boards to manage 
these projects. 
Ironically, decentralized grassroots community betterment projects 
laid the infrastructural ground for the relative centralization of state 
power that took place when Ali Abdullah Saleh came to office in the 
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late 1970s, as transportation access and educational curricula connected 
other urban areas and even remote provinces more tightly to Sanaa. 
Roads brought goods, strangers, and officials into the provinces, for 
instance, while schools utilized texts from the embryonic Ministry of 
Education and taught the national anthem. Ultimately the fledgling mil-
itary government was able to centralize social capital through bureau-
cratic controls and to claim credit for every classroom constructed with 
local resources. The national confederation oflocal development asso-
ciations morphed into the Ministry of Local Administration (Carapico 
1998). Entirely different in style and substance from the South's struggle 
for independence, the services-oriented direct-action "cooperative 
movement" also left its mark on Yemeni political history and socioeco-
nomic development. 
Yemen's third major civic opening heralded unification between the 
PDRY and North Yemen in 1990 according to a deal between Saleh and 
the remaining Socialist leaders of the PDRY. Stuck at the very end of 
the Cold War, this arrangement coincided with German unification. 
Unity introduced a panoply of political parties, including the YSP; 
Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC); a conservative Northern 
party called al-Isiah, close to the GPC and led by prominent Hashid and 
Islamist figures; and several smaller Nasserist, Baathist, and Shia parties. 
All had their own newspapers and agendas, and all fielded candidates in 
reasonably free and fair elections in 1993. When the two former ruling 
parties that still commanded the respective armed forces of the two 
Yemens refused to abide by the power-sharing mandate of the elections, 
however, armed conflict seemed imminent. The two armies squared of£ 
The Aden-based leadership of the Socialist Party and former PDRY 
army launched a bid for secession. 
Intellectual elites and ordinary people swung into action with mass 
public conferences in urban and tribal areas alike, with small but sig-
nificant nationwide peace protests, and with a National Dialogue of 
Political Forces that produced a constitution-like "contract of accord" 
to resolve the impasse short of armed combat (Carapico 1998). The 
forces of peace and reconciliation lost. In the two-month, army-to-
army military campaign that followed, Saleh's forces, buttressed by 
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self-declared antisocialist jihadis, conquered the old South and chased 
the YSP leaders into exile. 
Over the next decade and more, the victorious Saleh administration 
gradually tightened the vise on public civic expression. Elections were 
increasingly engineered to ensure victory for the president and his party 
faithful. Aspiring to but never quite mastering the absolute security con-
trol achieved in Syria or Libya, Saleh's administration left some room for 
an impotent opposition coalition comprising the unlikely bedfellows of 
al-Isiah, the Socialists, the assorted Arab nationalists, and small indig-
enous parties. Known as the Joint Meeting Parties {]MP), this opposi-
tion coalition was able to register a modicum of minority parliamentary 
dissent. Popular social forces were nearly; but never entirely; quelled. 
Under these circumstances of only a ceremonial facade of democ-
racy; people were still able to claim pieces of the public civic sphere in 
quotidian ways independent of state-sponsored spectacles of nation-
hood. In Yemen one of these is the ubiquitous practice of gathering in 
private homes to chew qat and talk politics in the afternoons, as well as 
participate in oral recitations of poetry. In the more explicitly public 
national sphere, expensive pageants such as the celebratory fanfare 
devoted to the bogus reelection of President Saleh were no more con-
stitutive of what it means to be Yemeni than the moral panic surround-
ing macabre incidents such as a series of murders in the Sanaa morgue 
(Wedeen 2008). In other words, shared reactions to extraordinary 
events as well as shared everyday practices can constitute the Yemeni 
"self" as an explicitly national or even democratic person, and this sense 
of national identity can be constituted even in the absence of actualiza-
tion through state institutions (Wedeen 2008, 15). A fairly vibrant if 
distinctly male-dominated public civic sphere survived. 
The antiregime protests of 2011-and to some extent, perhaps 
counterintuitively; even the pro-Saleh demonstrations staged in the 
military reviewing stand near his presidential palace throughout the 
year-echoed these precedents in distinct though varied ways. In 
particular, major regions and cities drew on local customs in ways that 
imagined and expressed national aspirations and the collective will 
of "the people." To explain this point it is necessary to map the social 
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geography of the pro-democracy movement. The protests transcended 
all the preexisting divisions of North versus South, urban versus tribal, 
Sanaa versus the hinterland, Shafa'i Sunni versus Shia Zaydi, uplands 
versus lowlands, political party loyalties, and conventional gender roles. 
Geographies of Protest 
A peaceful intifada had already been in motion since the summer of 2007 
in the South, the territory known as the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen and ruled by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) from late 1967 
to 1990. In 1990, the South unified with the North, already ruled by 
Saleh; it attempted secession four years later. During the short civil war, 
the president called in assorted tribal militias and ''Afghan Arabs" -
puritanical Salafis ostensibly returned from the victorious anti-Soviet 
jihad in Afghanistan-to assist the regular army under the command 
of General Ali Muhsin. A beer factory and civil service administra-
tion offices in the Southern capital of Aden were torched and looted. 
Eventually the erstwhile Southern leadership fled by boat to Oman, and 
Northern military officers and gangs of scalawags installed themselves 
as governors, administrators, and landowners. Workers deprived of their 
jobs, pensioners denied their benefits, and women stripped of the rights 
they had enjoyed under the old Socialist administration seethed under 
what they regarded as occupation. Oil revenues from wells on what had 
been Southern soil flowed into the coffers of Saleh and his cronies (Day 
2008). 
After more than a decade of economic collapse and political repres-
sion, the youth and some of the old YSP cadres launched al-Birak, a 
movement motivated largely by resurgent Southern nationalism {Dahl-
gren 2orn). It drew on some of the slogans, motifs, and performative 
elements of the anticolonial movement in Aden, the cities of the Hadra-
mawt, and other communities. Again these included both Socialist ele-
ments and locally distinctive traditions of dance, dress, and dialect. The 
movement also depended on human rights organizations and municipal 
newspapers established during the opening that followed unification in 
the early 1990s. By late 2orn, Saleh and his official media could success-
fully portray their distress as treasonous irredentist threats to national 
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unity reminiscent of the 1994 civil war. And indeed throughout 2011 
some citizens flew the flag of the old People's Republic, even as others 
joined the nationalist movement to oust the regime in Sanaa. 
Whether or not they harbored genuinely separatist ambitions, resi-
dents of the former PD RY had good reason to feel they were punitively 
targeted and deprived of basic liberties and entitlements. What was 
not evident to them until after the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt began 
was the extent of popular resentments and yearnings in the rest of the 
country. 
It turned out that many of the tribulations in the South resonated 
in every province of the republic: the grotesque enrichment of regime 
cronies at the expense of the multitudes, obscenely bad stewardship of 
the commons, the skyrocketing prices of meat, staples, and even clean 
water; the lack of jobs for college and high school graduates. Already 
by 2005 the American ambassador had noted in a WikiLeaked cable 
that riots prompted by the lifting of fuel subsidies had stimulated the 
prospects for a revolt, especially-but not only-among the perenni-
ally restive tribes of the northeastern provinces of al-Jawf and Marib, 
where truckers and pump farmers considered cheap fuel their lifeblood 
(Carapico 2011). Grandiose pageants of presidential power, half-truths 
in the official media, the indignities of military checkpoints, arbitrary 
arrests and imprisonments-these and other daily insults fed popular 
alienation, despair, and frustration, most notably among the youth. 
While a privileged few cooled off in swimming pools in their luxury 
compounds, the water table fell, decimating the farm economy that 
remained the livelihood of the rural majority. Farmers and ranchers 
facing starvation flocked to the cities, where water supplies and social 
services were swamped. Misery became the new normal; millions barely 
survived on the equivalent of a dollar or two a day. The economy was in 
shambles (Colton 2orn). 
The breakthrough came in Sanaa, the capital, a metropolitan area 
on the high central plateau whose population had quadrupled during 
the previous generation owing to the lures of government jobs, services, 
and payoffs. It was now a teaming, sprawling, poorly laid out, still pic-
turesque low-rise city of nearly two million inhabitants, more than half 
of whom were under twenty years of age. Its schools, sewage disposal 
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system, and water supplies were completely overwhelmed. Nominally 
both home and center to the ruling family and its security apparatus, 
Sanaa was also most exposed to its excesses and regulations and the 
prime site for parades of presidential power. 
Early in 2011 Saleh loyalists laid claim to Sanaa's central Midan al-
Tahrir so that it would not follow Cairo's example of becoming a stage 
for malcontents. Also the huge presidential, military, and ministerial 
complexes remained showplaces for Saleh photographs. Drawing from 
the precedents of the 1993-94 antiwar, pro-democracy demonstrations, 
therefore, students, faculty, and other activists assembled around the 
university campus on the western edge of the old part of Sanaa. They 
named the space they claimed Change Square (Midan al-Taghayr). 
Proportionately, the occupiers represented the demographic bulge of 
fifteen- to thirty-year-olds who had never known another leadership: 
university students, graduates, dropouts, and wannabes grasping for 
hope for a better future. In Change Square and adjoining spaces, these 
"peaceful youth" enlivened the experience with music, dancing, poetry 
readings, posters, street art, and collective gestures of defiance, such 
as fifty thousand pairs of clasped hands held high. The call to prayer 
became a call to civic engagement, and mass prayers became a form of 
civil disobedience. 
Inspired by Karman, who headed the NGO Women Journalists 
Without Chains, women defied a conservative cultural norm about 
speaking softly in public. They mocked the president's sleazy innuendo 
about an un-Islamic "mixing of the sexes" in Change Square. Almost 
all women in Sanaa wear the all-encompassing black sharshaf, which is 
a modern veil. At one point many thousands lined up, covered in the 
customary black. Some rows wore white baseball caps on top of their 
veils. Another group sported red baseball caps. Visually, the effect was 
to create a white, black, and red Yemeni flag stretching more than a 
kilometer down a wide road in a show of patriotism. 
The crowds around Sanaa University swelled as tribesmen - the 
ranchers, truckers, and farmers from outlying areas-joined the pro-
tests. Many of them pitched tents that eventually grew into a sprawling 
encampment snaking through the neighborhood around the university 
campus with its own sanitation system, medical services, teach-ins, 
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and food and water supplies. On March 18, plainclothes snipers fired 
from neighboring rooftops onto Change Square, killing more than fifty 
mostly youthful and entirely peaceful protesters. In disbelief, fury, and 
sorrow, a record 150,000 marched in Sanaa's biggest "day of rage" so far 
(Carapico 2on). An avalanche of top-level and midlevel resignations 
from the armed forces, the foreign service, the civil service, and even the 
president's General People's Congress followed in protest of the exces-
sive use of force against unarmed civilians. Among the defectors were 
General Ali Muhsin, the commander of the First Army Brigade who had 
dealt mercilessly with Southern secessionists in 1994, and key leaders 
of the president's own Hashid tribal confederation, including scions 
of the paramount sheikhship, the al-Ahmar family (for background on 
this division, see Phillips 2006). These defections from the president's 
inner circle split the regime and would eventually divide the capital city 
into pro- and anti-Saleh territory. At the same time, collective rage and 
moral panic gradually solidified the protests into a nationwide move-
ment. Sentiments crossed party lines: although they belonged to the 
same conservative political party, al-Isiah, Karman and the al-Ahmar 
brothers were on very different political wavelengths (for background, 
see Yadav 2010). 
In provincial cities where hundreds or thousands had attended ral-
lies, multitudes now laid claim to public spaces. In Ta'izz, a bustling 
commercial and industrial city of more than half a million people 
nestled in the verdant southern mountains of the former North, and in 
the picturesque neighboring city oflbb, simmering discontent erupted. 
The populous Ta'izz-Ibb area, known as the "middle regions," a once 
rich agricultural zone tilled by peasants and sharecroppers, served as 
a bridge between the Southern al-Hirak and the revolutionary move-
ment centered in Sanaa. People traveled, telephoned, and tweeted with 
family and compatriots in Aden, Hadramawt, Abyan, and other parts 
of the former PDRY already in foment. By summer, reporters were 
calling Ta'izz-a hub for exiled anti-imperialist Southern forces during 
the 1960s and a center of the cooperative movement in the 1970s-the 
epicenter of the democratic intifada. The city's relatively educated, cos-
mopolitan student body choreographed a nearly carnival atmosphere 
with music, skits, caricatures, graffiti, banners, and other artistic embel-
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lishments. Photos showed throngs massed in dozens of thousands. As in 
Aden and Sanaa, women and girls frequently organized separate marches 
and displays to underscore the unarmed, modern character of the revolt. 
On October 30, 2ou, for instance, they posted a YouTube video full of 
flowers, confetti, balloons, music, and ululating commemorating each 
of their martyrs by name and portrait. Meanwhile, perhaps even more 
than Sanaa, Ta'izz became a battlefield between pro- and antiregime 
security forces. 
In Hudayda, the steamy, squalid Red Sea port that is the hub of the 
Tihama coastal plain where Afro-Yemenis suffer the country's highest 
rates of poverty and political disenfranchisement, youth and parents 
also filled their own Freedom Square with banners and chants and insur-
rectionary graffiti. "Irhal!" they yelled in unison: Go! And, referring to 
the deposed Tunisian leader who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia: "Oh, 
Ali Abdullah, join Bin Ali in Riyadh!" First they applauded Mubarak's 
resignation. Many months later, like their compatriots in the highlands, 
they celebrated the demise of Libya's dictator Muammar Qaddafi and 
dedicated mass prayers to the martyrs of Syria. New mantras, skits, and 
cartoons taunted both the Yemeni and the Syrian dictators: "Come on 
Ali, come on Bashar, it's time for you to go!" ran the refrain. 
Raucous demonstrations mixed with familiar acts of civil disobedi-
ence such as road blockages and commercial stoppages in the wide-
open, semiarid, sparsely populated plateaus and mountains north, 
northwest, east, and somewhat south of Sanaa, regions analogous to 
Texas or Wyoming, the avowed tribal heartland where ranchers, cow-
boys, truck farmers, and hillbillies carry Kalashnikovs or even bazooka 
launchers and perennially harbor deep mistrust of the central govern-
ment. These demonstrations were especially prevalent in al-Jawf and 
Marib governorates, stretches of the north and east populated pre-
dominantly by members of the Bakil tribal confederation, the rival to 
Hashid. More reminiscent of the 1993-94 mass conferences than of 
the familiar low-grade armed resistance, kidnappings, and sabotage, 
these protests adopted the si!miyya approach. In al-Baydha, the small 
provincial capital of a heavily armed Bakil territory somewhat north of 
the former inter-Yemeni border, men who normally do not leave home 
without a rifle threw down their guns to march peacefully. This was 
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highly significant: in a country known to be awash in personal weapons, 
the mass uprising avoided guerrilla warfare or military insurrection. To 
repeat: tens of thousands of tribesmen with the means to launch an 
armed revolt resisted the temptation to open fire. 
Counterrevolutionary Forces 
The response to the peaceful protests was wrathful. Divisions loyal to 
the president, mostly commanded by immediate members ofhis family, 
fired on unarmed demonstrators in Sanaa, Aden, Ta'izz, Hudayda, and 
elsewhere. Hundreds of deaths stoked rather than quelled the protests, 
however. Grainy, graphic cell phone footage was uploaded to the Inter-
net. In each community, every funeral provoked more angry or grief-
stricken dissenters to call for the downfall of the regime. 
More explosively, loyalists and dissidents engaged one another in 
mortal combat, especially in certain neighborhoods ofSanaa. The blood-
iest battles pitted Saleh's family commands, including the Republican 
Guard and special forces, against the renegade brigade led by General 
Ali Muhsin and the Rashid tribal militia headed by the sons of the late 
great Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, who had been part of the Saleh regime 
for three decades. In other words, powerful elements of the president's 
inner circle representing key military and Hashid constituencies, long 
considered his base of support, had turned against him. At various times 
Saleh labeled them bloodthirsty, seditious traitors, coup makers, ter-
rorists, and thugs. General Ali Muhsin placed an armed cordon around 
the large neighborhood surrounding Change Square to protect the pro-
testers. There were frequent skirmishes around the al-Ahmar family 
compound on the airport road. The June explosion inside the mosque 
in the presidential palace compound, which left Saleh disfigured while 
killing or crippling several of his deputies, was almost certainly some 
kind of inside job (Phillips 20u). This was an intraregime squabble. The 
"peaceful youth'' emphatically did not line up behind the general or the 
sons of the old sheikh, al-Ahmar. 
The Saleh regime also repeated a tactic from 1994 in deliberately 
unleashing zealous militants, nowadays associated with al-Qaeda, 
against dissidents in parts of the old PDRY, especially Abyan and its 
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provincial capital, Zinjibar. Not more than a couple hundred fighters, 
many of them foreign, took advantage of the precipitous withdrawal 
of army and security units to overrun civilian officials in several towns. 
This subplot in the overall story of the Yemeni revolution dovetailed 
strangely with American counterterrorism operations targeting al-
Qaeda figures inside Yemen, including the U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaqi 
and his son, killed separately in their tribal homeland farther east in 
Shabwa province. Close coordination between American and Yemeni 
security officers in this field of operations allowed President Saleh to 
present himself as a reliable ally for the United States and Saudi Arabia 
against militant Islamists. 
The hegemon of the Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, played a high-profile 
yet rather inscrutable and seemingly ambivalent role, coaxing its long-
time ally to sign an agreement to transfer power but failing to press for 
a cease-fire. In May, Saudi Arabia and the other oil monarchies in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), working with the Yemeni opposition 
in the Joint Meeting Parties, announced a plan whereby Saleh would 
relinquish presidential power in exchange for immunity from prosecu- · 
tion for himself and his family. Saleh stalled and negotiated, three times 
promising and then refusing to sign the same document on the grounds, 
he said, that it was an invitation to hand power to the mutinous factions 
of the military. The United States and other Western powers joined the 
GCC in rhetorically supporting this vague agreement (the precise text 
of which was never released). 
The moment for Saleh's departure from office seemed to come in 
June, when he was airlifted to a top-of-the-line hospital in Saudi Arabia 
for emergency surgeries and then convalescence following the explosion 
inside the presidential compound. It was widely assumed that the Saudi 
government, a major donor to Yemen and specifically to the regime, 
would be both willing and able to prevent his return (Haykel 2on). In 
Saleh's absence, however, his son and nephews took aim at their allies 
turned rivals. Military and civilian deaths mounted, electricity and fuel 
supplies waned, and life in the cities became even more intolerable. 
More than three months later, on September 23, suddenly and some-
what mysteriously, the president returned to Sanaa, still insisting that he 
would relinquish power only after his government had organized tran-
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sitional elections. Not entirely unlike the bloodletting that took place 
among Socialist leaders in 1986 in Aden, intra-elite gun battles raged in 
Sanaa and Ta'izz throughout October and into November. 
Yet the international community did not press for a cease-fire or 
threaten sanctions against the Saleh regime. As another prominent 
female activist, Hooria Mashhour, tweeted on September 21, "We were 
expecting a stronger attitude from the GCC countries towards the 
crimes committed against the Yemeni people, but we get extremely 
disappointed to see the meeting between {Saudi} king Abdullah and 
Saleh." A month later, on October 21, the Security Council of the United 
Nations issued an ambiguous, toothless resolution condemning human 
rights violations by "the government and other actors" and calling for 
all sides to commit to a peaceful transition of power in accordance with 
the GCC formula. If the reactions were any indication, Resolution 
2014 favored the incumbent's position over the protesters' demands. 
Yemen's official press agency, Saba, enthused that Saleh "welcomed" 
what it phrased as "support for the Presidential decree of 12 September 
which is designed to find a political agreement acceptable to all parties, 
and to ensure a peaceful and democratic transition of power, including 
the holding of early Presidential elections" (Saba News 2on). Writing 
for the protesters, Tawakkol Karman (2on) opened an op-ed in the 
Guardian on November l with the words "Yemenis are ready to pay the 
ultimate price to take on a brutal dictator. Yet the UN can't even bring 
itself to condemn him." 
With arms raised, multitudes bewailed escalating violence and peti-
tioned the international community to intercede diplomatically. After 
a series of attacks on female activists by security forces, urban women 
in Sanaa, still wearing their customary sharshaf, staged a particularly 
Yemeni form of protest drawing on rural traditions: they set fire to a pile 
of old-fashioned bedspread-like veils called makrama, sending a sym-
bolic distress signal to the tribes. Their pamphlets read: "This is a plea 
from the free women of Yemen; here we burn our makrama in front of 
the world to witness the bloody massacres carried out by the tyrant 
Saleh." Marchers in al-Baydha, Ibb, and other cities and towns cried for 
Saleh's prosecution in an international court. Demonstrators in Sanaa 
and Ta'izz adopted the slogans "Remaining peaceful is our choice" and 
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"Peaceful, peaceful, no to civil war." "The Yemenis' voice is one," they 
shouted in November, "we will bring corrupt Saleh to justice." 
At a ceremony on November 23 in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, wit-
nessed by Gulf royalty and Western diplomats, a smiling Saleh finally 
affixed his signature to four copies of the so-called GCC deal. There 
was no celebration whatsoever, because few Yemenis trusted either the 
deal or his signature. The following day, back in the presidential palace, 
still acting as head of state, he declared an "amnesty'' for those who had 
committed "errors" while vowing to prosecute perpetrators of"crimes" 
against his person and his administration. Karman, who was on a world-
wide speaking tour, charmed audiences, but the specifics of her message 
went unheeded. Blood continued to flow, particularly in the streets of 
Ta'izz, while the international community scarcely raised an eyebrow. 
Conclusions 
The 2011 uprising built on the social capital from earlier civic moments 
in Yemeni history: the Third World cries for independence of the now-
aging 1960s generation, the cravings for modern services and education 
of the 1970s, and the pro-democracy patriotic sentiments of the early 
1990s. Just as each of these very different mobilizations left its legacy, 
so too would this one. Even should it prove to have been relatively 
short-lived, this fourth civic opening had been the widest and the most 
inclusive part of an earth-shattering pan-Arab movement for change. 
The uprising will have shaped the national civic consciousness of 
today's youth for decades to come. The new civic awareness of the 
Yemeni public was fed by much more than electoral pageantry or 
moral repugnance at murders in the morgue, displays of intraregime 
violence and excessive force against demonstrators, or the spuriously 
bizarre policies of Yemen's international patrons. Moreover, anyone 
who has participated in mass public events-the American civil rights, 
antiwar, or Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, for instance, or even 
highly competitive football matches in huge stadiums - knows how 
electrifying it is to be part of a crowd cheering or booing in unison. The 
Nobel Prize that enabled one eloquent and forceful, but rather ordinary; 
spokeswoman to appeal to the United Nations and the world for action 
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further nurtured patriotic pride and shored up the hopes of protesters 
persevering against long odds. 
The near-term outcome probably will be neither full-scale revolu-
tion nor a smooth transition. Before all this happened, intelligence 
analysts considered Yemen unstable and possibly hovering on the edge 
of state failure. The next phase might be cruel, messy, or both. The 
country could split along North-South lines or other fractures. Commu-
nities could resort to armed resistance. Saleh and his sons and nephews 
seemed to prefer civil war or anarchy to stepping down; and General 
Ali Muhsin, the al-Ahmar brothers, a few other conventional actors, 
and small bands of al-Qaeda-type militants had joined in battle. After 
the gruesome death of the Libyan dictator heightened public deter-
mination for the demise of both Ali Abdullah Saleh and Syria's Bashar 
al-Assad, Saleh's gunmen cracked down harder on civilian protesters and 
prepared to wage all-out war with military defectors.Jihadist infiltrators 
from Saudi Arabia seemed to be provoking conflict in Sa'adah province. 
After the American drone strikes that killed the al-Awlaqis, the risk that 
either a terrorist attack or counterterrorism operations would ignite 
fighting on new fronts could not be discounted. Uncounted dangers lay 
on the road ahead, with little sign of diplomatic intervention from the 
United Nations, the United States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, or 
any other quarters. 
Even under the worst-case scenarios, however, there had been a radi-
cal change that amounted to a civic _revolution for Yemen and the whole 
Arab world. Never in the long history of the Arabian Peninsula had citi-
zens acting as such constituted a body politic and assembled en masse to 
insist on political reform. For 2011, at least, Southern malcontents and 
rebels in Sa'adah found common national cause with college students 
in Sanaa and Ta'izz and with tribesmen from the hinterlands around 
ideas about social justice, nonviolence, and better governance. However 
divided they were between the more widespread and popular movement 
for change and the still not-insignificant minority who turned out for 
Saleh rallies, "the people" spoke out and claimed the metaphorical and 
physical commons. 
Yemen's "peaceful youth" activists raised their voices not only as a 
nation but also in unison with revolutionaries elsewhere in the Arab 
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world. This was also a substantial development. It was not impossible 
in 2010 to imagine Yemen exploding with mass fury, or to foresee a 
"take to the streets moment" in Cairo, or to recognize the alienation 
ofTunisians from the Ben Ali regime. What could not be foreseen were 
the simultaneity, synchronization, and solidarity that arose among 
essentially leaderless protests from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian 
Ocean and beyond. A virtual Arab/Arabic-language public civic sphere 
expanded through cell phones and the Internet as well as through Al 
Jazeera and other broadcasters, until customary forms of censorship 
and intimidation could not contain the flow of information. It was even 
more remarkable that a religious thirty-two-year-old mother of three in 
a head scarf from the most remote, poverty-stricken, socially conserva-
tive corner of the Arab world would go down in world history as the 
embodiment of peaceful pro-democracy agitation in the region. Finally, 
by the end of 2on, a variation of the somewhat anarchic, antisystemic 
Liberation Square sit-ins and campouts in Arab countries had spread 
across the globe as young people from Athens to New York and many 
other cities occupied physical and virtual civic spaces in a worldwide 
wave of protests. It was quite remarkable that several million young 
Yemenis, represented by one young mother, were so much in the van-
guard of this global movement for local, national, and worldwide change. 
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